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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
III
ELEMENTS OF CAPITAL GAIN - GENERAL (cont'd)
WHAT IS A CAPITAL ASSET?
Richard Katcher
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
The definition of a capital asset contained in the Internal Revenue
Code is disarming in its simplicity. Section 1221 states that the term
"capital asset" means any "property" held by the taxpayer, whether or
not connected with his trade or business. Obviously, such a broad defi-
nition standing alone would sweep the proceeds from almost every sale
into the capital gain area. That result is prevented by the remaining pro-
visions of section 1221, which set forth the types of property which are
excepted from the broad general definition. This statutory pattern of a
broad definition followed by definitive exclusions induces taxpayers to
try to avoid falling within the exclusions. If the property is not within
the exclusions, then the property is a capital asset, the gain on which is
taxed as capital gain upon sale or exchange. Consequently, there is in-
creasing pressure on the courts to interpret broadly the statutory exclu-
sions and to restrict severely the meaning of "property," in the guise of
effectuating basic congressional purposes with respect to the nature of
the capital gain provisions. The courts have responded to this pressure
by superimposing upon section 1221 a judicial concept of "property" that
does, in effect, narrow its meaning.1
The purpose of this article is to discuss generally the statutory exclu-
sions of section 1221 and the judicial concept of property; subsequent
articles in this symposium analyze specific problems within these areas.
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS AS AFFECTED BY THE CHARACTER
OF THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
Stock in Trade and Other Property of a Kind Includable
in Inventory
To insure that the profits flowing from the day-to-day conduct of a
business will be treated as ordinary income, the capital gain provisions
exclude from their application property consisting of stock in trade or
1. See Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960); Corn Prods. Ref.
Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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inventory of the taxpayer.2 Hence, sales of such property are not sales
of capital assets. This exclusion applies even to a bulk sale of inventory
and stock in trade from which the taxpayer previously derived his income
through sales to customers.'
Similarly, even if the property in question does not constitute stock
in trade or inventory, if that property is held by the taxpayer "primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business,"4
it is not regarded as a capital asset. Accordingly, even though a taxpayer
may not be classified as a "dealer" in the property involved, if he holds
the property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business, its sale will result in ordinary income and not capital gain.5
This exclusion from the term "capital asset" is not difficult of appli-
cation in so far as it relates to stock in trade and inventory, and its pur-
pose is apparent. However, the exclusion of property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business has been the subject
of considerable litigation and will be discussed below.
Copyrights and Literary, Musical and Artistic Compositions
A second exclusion from the statutory definition of "capital asset"
treats as ordinary income amounts paid to a taxpayer for his creative
labor. It provides that a copyright, a literary, musical or artistic compo-
sition, and similar property are excluded from the term "capital asset" if
(a) held by a taxpayer whose personal efforts created the property or
(b) by a taxpayer whose basis for the property (for the purpose of de-
termining gain) is determined, in whole or in part, by reference to the
basis of the property in the creator's hands.' This exclusion is so broad
in its application that it denies capital gain treatment to the amateur as
well as the professional creator.7
If a number of individuals through their combined personal efforts
as employees of a corporation create a copyright, that copyright may be
classified as a capital asset in the corporate owner's hands if the corpora-
2. INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, § 1221(1). (Hereinafter cited as §).
3. Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949); compare § 337(b) (2),
involving nonrecognition of gain on the bulk sale of inventory in connection with certain
corporate liquidations.
4. § 1221(1).
5. See Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank, 22 T.C. 1343 (1954). Real estate cannot be included
in inventory. John S. Phipps, 19 B.T.A. 1293, 1297 (1930).
6. § 1221 (3). The Regulations interpret "similar property" to cover theatrical productions,
radio programs, newspaper cartoon strips, and other property eligible for copyright protection.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1 (c). (Hereinafter cited as Reg.). A "character" in a book is within
the scope of this exclusion. Stern v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847 (D. La. 1958), aff'd per
curiam, 262 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1959).
7. Compare § 1235, which provides capital gain treatment to patents regardless of the classi-
fication of the inventors as amateurs or professionals.
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tion paid all expenses and costs and fairly compensated the individuals
for their services.8 However, if a copyright or similar property were
transferred to a newly organized corporation in exchange for its stock and
the stock were then sold, capital gain treatment would probably be pre-
cluded by the "collapsible corporation" provisions of the Code
The profit on the sale of a copyright by a person who received it as a
gift from the creator will be treated as ordinary income. This result is
dictated by the statutory exclusion from the definition of "capital asset"
of property whose basis in the hands of the taxpayer is determined by
reference to its basis in the hands of the creator. Since a donee takes his
donor's basis for the property given,"0 the copyright in this case would
not be a capital asset. This exclusion was deemed necessary to dose a
loophole for capital gain treatment previously available to a donee who
did not hold the property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his business. Conversely, an heir of the creator or a purchaser
from the creator may obtain capital gain treatment on the subsequent
sale of the copyright since this property acquires a new basis in his hands
when acquired from the creator."
Accounts and Notes Receivable
The 1954 Code specifically excludes from the definition of a capital
asset accounts and notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of
trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of stock in trade,
inventory, or property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business.'" The 1939 Code did not exclude such accounts and
notes receivable, and the courts generally held that such property, even
though acquired in the course of the taxpayer's trade or business, was a
capital asset.'" This exclusion was added to the 1954 Code in order to
accord ordinary, rather than capital, loss treatment to accounts and notes
receivable previously included in income and subsequently sold at a loss.
However, if such property is sold for an amount greater than the amount
8. Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 300, 301.
9. § 341. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1950).
10. § 1015.
11. If the creator had sold his work prior to his death, amounts received thereafter are treated
as income in respect of a decedent. Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 25, at 13;
Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 361. In view of the ordinary income treatment that at-
taches to the sale of property created by a taxpayer's personal efforts, the taxpayer should try
to avoid the telescoping of that income into one taxable year. Two means of preventing that
result are: qualifying the sale for installment method reporting or taking advantage of the
'spreadback" provisions. §§ 453, 1302.
12. 5 1221 (4).
13. Graham Mill & Elevator Co. v. Thomas, 152 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1945); Max Torodor,
19 T.C. 530 (1952).
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previously reported as income, the excess is treated as ordinary income
because the property is not a capital asset.
The Code does not exclude all accounts and notes receivable from
the definition of capital assets. For example, an otherwise non-capital
receivable may be transformed into a capital asset by making it the sub-
ject of a gift.' 4 Furthermore, accounts or notes receivable acquired for
capital assets or "section 1231 assets" or acquired otherwise than in the
ordinary course of business apparently fall outside the exclusion and
therefore within the definition of a capital asset.
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS AS AFFECTED BY THE
INTRINSIC CHARACTER OF THE PROPERTY
Depreciable and Real Property Used in Trade or Business
Section 1221 excludes depreciable property and real property, if used
in a trade or business, from the definition of a capital asset."
In order for property to meet the latter exclusionary requirement of
the statute - "use in the trade or business" - it is not necessary that at
the time of its disposition it must be actively employed in the business;
it is sufficient if it had previously been devoted to use in the business.
Accordingly, the discontinuance of the active use of the property does
not change its character previously established as business property. 6
However, if it can be established that the property had been abandoned
by the taxpayer and had not been put to use in the business for many
years, it will be regarded as a capital asset.'
One of the two types of business property which section 1221 ex-
cludes from the category of capital asset is that which is "depreciable."
If the property sold is of this character, it is not a capital asset even
though the taxpayer failed to take a depreciation deduction. In other
words, the failure to take the deduction does not change the character
of the property from depreciable to non-depreciable.' Similarly, the fact
that the property has been fully depreciated at the time of sale is imma-
terial, since the property was of the character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation.'
Section 1221 also excludes real estate used in the taxpayer's trade or
business. In this connection, considerable controversy has arisen with
14. Compare this treatment of receivables with the treatment accorded copyrights which are
the subject of a gift; see discussion p. 258.
15. 5 1221(2).
16. Alfred Kruse, 29 T.C. 463 (1957); Graves Bros. Co., 17 T.C. 1499 (1952).
17. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 20 T.C. 630 (1953); cf. Alamo Broadcasting Co., 15 T.C. 534
(1950).
18. Claire A. Pekras, 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 827, aff'd per curiam, 139 F.2d 699 (6th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 739 (1944).
19. Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 CtM. BULL. 300.
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respect to whether the rental of a single piece of real estate, such as a
home, is a "business" of a taxpayer who devotes all his working hours
to the operation of another vocation. The determination of whether such
rental constitutes a trade or business of the taxpayer is to be made in the
light of all the facts in the particular case. If the taxpayer's activities
with respect to the property are no more extensive than leasing the prop-
erty or collecting rent, it is difficult to conclude that the taxpayer is there-
by conducting a business. However, if the property requires active man-
agement by the taxpayer or his agents, if frequent repairs must be made,
or if there are numerous tenants or employees, the rental of the property
would appear to be a trade or business of the taxpayer and, hence, the
property would not be a capital asset."°
It should be noted that, notwithstanding the "business property" ex-
clusion, section 1231 allows the net gain on the sales of such property
held for more than six months, if the total gains exceed the total losses,
to be treated as capital gain unless the property is stock in trade, inven-
tory, or held primarily for sale to customers. If the total losses exceed
the total gains, the net loss is treated as an ordinary loss. Therefore, if
both losses and gains are involved, it is advantageous for the taxpayer to
try to establish that the property sold at a loss was stock in trade, inven-
tory, or held primarily for sale to customers; such losses would then be
treated as ordinary losses and would not be offset against the section
1231 capital gains. Losses which are subject to section 1231 reduce the
only-partially-taxable capital gain. Eliminating the necessity of this offset
thus gives a double benefit to the taxpayer.
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS AS AFFECTED BY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THE PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED OR HELD BY THE TAXPAYER
Property Held Primarily for Sale to Customers
The last statutory exclusion from the definition of capital asset to be
considered21 is "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
20. The cases in this area in many respects appear inconsistent. Sometimes it is the taxpayer
who argues that he has been conducting a business, and sometimes it is the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue who so argues, depending upon whether an ordinary or capital loss is desired.
Bauer v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 539 (Ct. Cl. 1958); cf. Grier v. United States, 120 F.
Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), af)'d per curiam, 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955), holding that
the rental of a single piece of real estate does not cause the taxpayer to be engaged in business.
The contrary result is reached in Reiner v. United States, 222 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1955);
Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943); Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946);
Daniel O'Madigan, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC (29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 5 60,212 (Oct.
7, 1960). See also Susan P. Emery, 17 T.C. 308 (1950), wherein the Tax Court held that
unimproved rental property was not property used in business. Cf. John E. Good, 16 T.C.
906 (1951).
21. § 1221(5), not considered here, excludes, in general, from the definition of a capital
asset any governmental obligation issued on or after Match 1, 1941, on a discount basis and
payable without interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
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tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.""2  The purpose
of this exdusion obviously is to treat the "normal source of business in-
come ' 23 as ordinary income. The problem in this area is to determine
whether, in a particular case, the property sold had been so held for sale
to customers or whether it had been an investment. For years the courts
have struggled unsuccessfully for a formula that would provide a ready
answer. Failing in that, they have looked for assistance to various criteria,
such as the purpose of acquisition (sale or investment), the number of
sales, advertising and selling efforts, the "busyness" test,24 the taxpayer's
other activities, and the purpose for which the proceeds were reinvested.
Since each case is to be determined on its own facts, it is not surprising
that there is little consistency among the cases.
In this connection, an interesting problem has arisen, particularly
where real estate is involved. The courts are seemingly in conflict as to
whether property acquired originally for investment is converted into a
non-capital asset on the "liquidation" of that property where consider-
able activities are required in order to dispose of the property, or whether
the investment character remains despite such activities. 5 For example,
a taxpayer who has held a large tract of unimproved land as an invest-
ment for many years and who now wishes to dispose of it may find it
necessary and more profitable to subdivide the land and install sewers
and other improvements.
Other cases have wrestled with the treatment of the gain on the sale
of houses which, when constructed, were required by law to be rented
and which were subsequently sold when the "no sales" restrictions were
lifted." The question here was whether the property was held primar-
ily" for rental or primarily for sale to customers.
22. § 1221(1).
23. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
24. See Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938); William E. Starke, 35 T.C.
No. 4 (Oct. 7, 1960).
25. For capital gain treatment, see Estate of Barrios v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.
1959); Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1957); Con-
sol. Naval Stores Co. v. Fabs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955); Chandler v. United States,
226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955). For ordinary income treatment, see Pennroad Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 261 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1958); Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256
(9th Cit. 1952).
26. For capital gain treatment, see Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956);
Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955); Dillon v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d
218 (8th Cir. 1954); Victory Housing No. 2, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir.
1953); Delsing v. United States, 186 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1951). For ordinary income treat-
ment, see Pool v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1957); Pacific Homes, Inc. v. United
States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956); Home Co. v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.
1954); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951). Cf. Winnick v.
Commissioner, 199 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1952). It has been held that a builder realizes ordi-
nary income rather than capital gain upon the sale of a building which he constructed as part of
a package deal involving his selection of the site, assistance in design and lease negotiation,
making financial arrangements, and construction of the building. Heebner v. Commissioner,
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This problem is, of course, not confined to real estate. Where per-
sonal property has been leased, its subsequent sale may result in ordinary
income on the theory that the purpose of holding the property was both
for rental and sale."8 However, if the sales are regarded as a necessary
incident of the rental business but not the business itself of the taxpayer,
the property may retain its character as a capital asset.2"
With respect to the tax treatment accorded a person who engages in
a substantial number of purchases and sales of stock, it has been deter-
mined that trading in securities for a person's own account, regardless of
how extensive the trading may be, is not "selling to customers.""0  Ac-
cordingly, such securities are capital assets."' While normally securities
in a securities dealer's hands are not considered to be capital assets be-
cause they are held for sale to customers, they may be, if within thirty
days after their acquisition they are properly identified as an investment,
and if, thereafter, the securities are not held for sale to customers.32
The courts have encountered difficulty in applying the "primarily
held for sale to customers" concept in cases in which the taxpayer daims
the character of the property was changed from an ordinary asset to a
capital asset by virtue of the liquidation or termination of the business
through the sale of the property. Generally speaking, such efforts on
the part of the taxpayer have failed.3  However, where a liquidating
corporation distributes its inventory to its shareholders, who then sell it,
it has been held that the inventory comes into their hands as a capital
CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (60.2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 9548 (3d Cir. June 23, 1960).
See also James E. Kesicki, 34 T.C. No. 70 (June 30, 1960); Rev. Rul. 59-345, 1959-2 CuM.
BULL. 136.
27. "Primarily" as used in § 1221(1) has been interpreted to mean "essential" or "sub-
stantial," not "principal" or "chief." Rollingwood Corp v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th
Cir. 1951).
28. Greene-Haldeman v. Commissioner, 6 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5565 (9th Cit. 1960); S.E.C.
Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (D.C.N.Y. 1956), afJd per curiam, 241 F.2d 416
(2d Cit. 1957).
29. Hillard v. Commissioner, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5284 (6th Cir. 1960); Philber Equip.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cit. 1956).
30. Commissioner v. Burnett, 118 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1941); George R. Kemon, 16 T.C.
1026 (1951). But see Herman Katz, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (29 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.) 5 60,200 (Sept. 28, 1960) (gain from the sale of stock in eight corporations held
ordinary income even though the taxpayer was not a dealer, because the taxpayer organized the
corporations for the purpose of selling the stock).
31. This result obtains whether the person is regarded as an investor or trader engaged in
business. However, it is to be noted that in the real estate area there is no distinction taxwise
between a "trader" and "dealer." Charles H. Black, Sr., 45 B.T.A. 204 (1941), acq., 1941-2
CUM. BULL. 2.
32. § 1236. Such investment cannot give rise to ordinary loss treatment on its subsequent
disposition even though at the time of disposition it is held for sale to customers in the or-
dinary course of business. § 1236(b); Reg. § 1.1236-1(b).
33. See Baker v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1957); Simonsen Indus. v. Com-
missioner, 243 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1957); Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170
(9th Cir. 1949).
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asset."4 Furthermore, property which in the hands of a decedent was
held primarily for sale to customers may be a capital asset in the hands
of his estate.35
The fact that the property which is purchased and sold is not of a
type with which the taxpayer usually deals in his business does not neces-
sarily mean that such property was a capital asset; if the property was
purchased for purposes of resale, it will generally be regarded as an ordi-
nary asset. 8
The "Property" Concept
It has been noted above that section 1221 approaches the problem
of defining a capital asset negatively by stating specifically what is not a
capital asset; anything not so excepted is a capital asset. In view of the
favorable tax treatment accorded capital gains, it would seem more rea-
sonable instead to set forth affirmatively a specific, limited definition of
a capital asset. The latter approach is, in effect, being recognized by the
courts, since in recent years there has been a significant trend in the judi-
cial interpretation of the term "capital asset" - a trend which limits
sharply the meaning of "property" by excluding from it all property held
in a taxpayer's business other than as an investment.
This trend was spearheaded by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Corn Products Refining Company v. Commissioner," wherein it was held
that a manufacturer of corn products which bought and sold corn futures
as an integral part of its manufacturing business was not entitled to treat
such futures as a capital asset. The Supreme Court admitted that the corn
futures could not be placed into any of the statutory exclusions to the
definition of a capital asset. However, it approached the problem not
from the statutory definition of a capital asset, but from what it regarded
as a corollary purpose of the capital gain statutes: to tax as ordinary in-
come the income from the day-to-day operation of a business regardless
of the nature of the asset from which the income was derived. The Court
held that the gains of the Corn Products Refining Company from the
corn futures were "closely geared to a company's manufacturing enter-
prise . . . [and] important to its successful operation,"8 and, therefore,
34. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956). See Commissioner v.
Williams, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958); Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1958).
35. Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954), acq., 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 4.
36. Hollis v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954); Morris W. Zack, 25 T.C.
676 (1955), affd Per curiam, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957). Contra, Commissioner v. Wil-
liams, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958); Fidler v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1956);
Reynolds v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1946); Anatole Litvak, 23 T.C. 441
(1954), nonacq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 9.
37. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
38. Id. at 50.
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were not capital gains. Accordingly, it now appears that transactions
involving assets which are an essential aspect of a taxpayer's business will
bear ordinary income consequences even though those assets do not fall
within the section 1221 exclusions."
To escape the thrust of the Corn Products case, it is necessary that the
particular property be classified as an investment. Clearly, shares of stock
purchased as an investment are capital assets. However, where a tax-
payer is required by a seller to purchase the seller's stock in order to be
allowed to purchase the seller's product as inventory for his business, the
courts have allowed the taxpayer to deduct as an ordinary loss his loss
on his subsequent sale of the stock. This result is reached, even though
the stock does not fit into any of the statutory exclusions, on the theory
that the stock was not purchased for investment purposes but as a part
of the operation of the taxpayer's business. In reaching the result that
the loss on the sale is deductible as an ordinary loss, the courts depart
from a strict interpretation of the statutory language that stock is "prop-
erty." They conclude that the purchase and sale of the stock is merely
an incident in the conduct of the taxpayer's business. In some instances
the loss is allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense, which
obviates the necessity of determining whether the stock is "property."4
Some decisions have met the problem directly and have concluded that
the loss is attributable to a sale of an ordinary asset;41 others do not
dearly state the basis of their reasoning.'
These decisions show that the courts will not regard separately these
tie-in purchases, with the result that an asset which, standing alone, would
be property falling outside the statutory exclusions is nevertheless re-
garded as a non-capital asset because it was purchased in conjunction with
other property held primarily for sale to customers.4" As an initial propo-
sition, it is difficult to conclude that the stock in these tie-in purchases was
property held primarily for sale to customers. However, the Corn Prod-
39. See Mansfield Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1960); Weiler v.
United States, CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 9725 (M.D. Pa.
1960).
40. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Edwards v. Hogg,
214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955); Rev.
Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 275. Cf. Gulftex Drug Co., 29 T.C. 118 (1957), affd per
curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958) (wherein the stock was regarded as an "investment"
because of the length of time it was held prior to its sale); Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 163 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947). See § 1054, added to the Internal Revenue Code in
1960, with regard to FNMA stock.
41. See Western Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952), acq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL 8.
42. See Electrical Fittings Co., 33 T.C. No. 115 (March 18, 1960), wherein the court said
it is not necessary to state the particular section under which the loss is allowable although the
particular circumstances indicated that "it should be allowed" under § 165.
43. Quaere: Would the courts have reached the same result if the stock had been sold at a
profit rather than at a loss?
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ucts decision renders academic the question of the proper basis upon
which these tie-in cases will be decided. If the facts indicate that the
stock was not acquired as an investment, but rather as an "integral part
of the taxpayer's business," the stock will be an ordinary asset, not a
capital asset.
Furthermore, the word "property" in section 1221 is broad enough to
encompass intangible items, such as compensation, rent, dividends and
interest. While recognizing that in the abstract such claims might be
property, the courts have failed to accord them that status for capital
gain purposes. Consistent with the "investment" purpose of the capital
gain provisions, the courts refuse to treat as capital assets items that
basically represent income rather than an increase in the value of income-
producing property.44 Accordingly, the rule has evolved that the amount
received for an assignment, sale or other disposition of a right to ordinary
income will be regarded as an anticipatory receipt of ordinary income
rather than as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset. Nowhere has
this principle been more evident than in the area of compensation for
personal services. The sale of rights to compensation, even if such rights
have been converted into "property" such as a note or a contract, gives
rise to ordinary income.4 5 This concept has been extended to payments
received for covenants not to compete,4" but not to payments for good-
will, which is consistently regarded as a capital asset
The transfer of an entire interest in property which contains an ele-
ment of accrued but unpaid ordinary income will not clothe the built-in
income with capital asset protection. In such a situation, the proceeds
from the property sold will be separated, and that portion which repre-
sents ordinary income will be taxed as such. For example, the considera-
tion received for the sale of a note on which payments of principal and
interest are in default is taxable as ordinary income to the extent the
consideration received exceeds the face value of the note.48 Furthermore,
44. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
45. Glenn E. Alexander, 34 T.C. No. 78 (July 29, 1960); David L. Gordon, 29 T.C. 510
(1957); Samuel Towers, 24 T.C. 199 (1955), a 'd on other issues, 247 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1957); W. F. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951); Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C. 407 (1951); Charles J.
Williams, 5 T.C. 639 (1945). See § 1221(4).
46. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); Hamlin's Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954); Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cit.
1936).
47. Rev. RUl. 55-79, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 370. See Rev. RuI. 60-301, 1960 INT. REv. BuLT
No. 38, at 7.
48. Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
See also Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942), wherein a declared
dividend on stock was sold shortly before it became payable; F. Rodney Paine, 23 T.C. 391
(1954), rev'd on other grounds, 236 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1956).
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the courts have recently determined that gains from the sales of annuity
and endowment policies were not gains from the sales of capital assets.49
A present realization of future income, even though accomplished by
the sale of property, will not be regarded as arising from the sale of a
capital asset.5" The theory, as recently expressed by the Supreme Court
in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Incorporated,"' wherein carved-out oil
payment rights were sold, is that since the consideration is paid for the
right to receive future income, it is taxable as ordinary income and is out-
side the capital gain protection afforded to "property." In reaching this
conclusion, the Supreme Court brushed aside the question of whether the
oil payment rights were interests in land and whether they were "prop-
erty" within the scope of section 1221. The proceeds from the sale of
a right to future ordinary income retain an ordinary income status.
CONCLUSION
A capital asset is defined in section 1221 as "property held by the
taxpayer," to which broad definition there are specific statutory exclu-
sions. These exclusions do not generally give rise to substantial legal
questions of interpretation. However, since every item which falls out-
side these exclusions, and which might, in the normal sense, be regarded
as "property," will be classified as a capital asset, the courts have taken
upon themselves the task of determining whether under a particular set
of facts the asset sold is "property" within the congressional purpose in
enacting the capital gain provisions. Accordingly, it is to be expected
that the "property" concept will be flexible rather than rigid. The Su-
preme Court has stated the principle that the term "capital asset" is to be
construed narrowly in order to conform to the congressional purpose of
granting capital gain treatment only in situations involving the realiza-
tion of appreciation in the value of property. Therefore, payments re-
ceived from the normal operation of a business and payments which flow
from income or in substitution of income will not be from property
qualifying as a capital asset."
49. Commissioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960); Arnfeld v. United States, 163
F. Supp. 865 (Cr. Cl. 1958).
50. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). See Commissioner v. Gillette
Motor Transp., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
51. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
52. For further discussion of the subjects discussed herein, see Freeman, Is There a New Con-
cept of Business Asset? 36 TAXEs 110 (1958); Huston, Tie-In Sales, 10 TAX L. REV. 145
(1954); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985
(1956); Zarky, Capital Gain Concepts: What Is a Capital Asset? When Is There a "Sale or
Exchange?" U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx INsr. 357; Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital" As-
sets Acquired for Business: The New Criterion, 65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956).
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